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On the ‘Disclosure Initiative – Principles of Disclosure’: the 
EAA Financial Reporting Standards Committee’s view 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper summarises the contents of a comment letter produced by a working group 
of 12 academics in response to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
Discussion Paper on principles of disclosure. The comment letter was submitted by the 
Financial Reporting Standards Committee (FRSC) of the European Accounting 
Association (EAA). The work includes reviews of relevant academic literature of areas 
related to the various questions posed by the IASB in the Discussion Paper, including 
the ‘disclosure problem’ and the objective of the project, the suggested principles of 
effective communication, the roles of the primary financial statements and notes, the 
location of information and the use of performance measures. The paper also discusses 
the disclosure of accounting policies, the objectives of centralised disclosure, and the 
New Zealand Accounting Standards Board staff’s approach to disclosure. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper provides the views of the Financial Reporting Standards Committee (FRSC) 
on the Discussion Paper (DP) Disclosure Initiative – Principles of Disclosure (IASB, 
2017) published by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, the Board) 
in March 2017.  
 
The IASB project on Principles of Disclosure is part of the Board’s general ambition to 
improve financial reporting communication, and is also a central part of the Board’s 
work plan for the period 2017–21. The umbrella term for projects in this area is the 
Disclosure Initiative (DI), established in 2013 (DP, IN2, p. 4): 
 
‘The DI is a broad-based initiative exploring how to make disclosures more effective 
in financial statements…’ 
 
In turn, the DI is a key part of a portfolio of projects where the common theme is ‘Better 
Communication in Financial Reporting.’ The portfolio also includes projects on 
‘Primary Financial Statements’, ‘Management Commentary’ and ‘IFRS Taxonomy’. A 
driving force behind these projects is that investors have told the IASB that financial 
statements are often poorly presented, which makes it difficult and time-consuming for 
them to identify useful information (IASB project web page, October 2018).  
 
The main objective of the Principles of Disclosure project, discussed in this paper, is 
described as follows (DP, IN3, p. 4): 
 
‘…to identify disclosure issues and develop new, or clarify existing, disclosure 
principles in IFRS Standards to address those issues and to: a) help entities to apply 
better judgement and communicate information more effectively, b) improve the 
effectiveness of disclosures of the primary users of financial statements and, c) assist 
the Board to improve disclosure judgement and communicate information more 
effectively.’  
 
These disclosure principles could be either high-level concepts (as for example 
principles of effective communication as discussed in Section 2 of this work) or general 
requirements for disclosing information. In terms of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), the IASB believes the project is likely to result either in 
amendments to IAS 1 or in the creation of a new general disclosure standard that would 
build on and replace the parts of IAS 1 that cover disclosures in the financial statements 
(IASB project web page, March 2018). It is also possible that the project leads to 
development of some non-mandatory guidance (cf. the Materiality Practice Statement). 
 
The aim of the DP is to obtain stakeholders’ views on (a) disclosure issues that the 
Board has identified during its outreach before and during this project and (b) 
approaches to address these issues, including the Board’s preliminary views in some 
cases on how issues may be solved. The Board acknowledges that the DP does not 
cover all issues the Board would need to address with regard to an Exposure Draft of a 
general disclosure standard, and notes that the Board is also open to add more disclosure 
issues to the project.  
 
 
The Financial Reporting Standards Committee (FRSC) of the European Accounting 
Association (EAA) responds to selected comment letter invitations where academic 
research can be expected to contribute to the IASB’s standard-setting process. This is 
also supporting the IASB’s evidence-based approach to standard setting (cf. Birt et al., 
2016). As disclosures play an important role in both theoretical and empirical academic 
research, the FRSC decided to form a working group with the aim to respond to the 
questions posed in the DP by means of a comment letter submitted to the IASB on the 
2nd October 2017. This paper builds on the comment letter, and discusses the proposals 
set by the Board regarding the Principles of Disclosure DP. It should be acknowledged 
that another working group of the FRSC conducted a comprehensive literature review 
and analysis of disclosure-related matters a few years ago, when addressing issues 
raised in the discussion paper developed jointly by European Financial Reporting 
Advisory Group (EFRAG), Autorité des normes comptables (ANC) in France, and the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK (EFRAG, ANC and FRC, 2012). 
Findings and conclusions were presented in an article by the working group members 
in 2013, Barker et al. (2013). The discussion paper by EFRAG, ANC and FRC (2012) 
suggest a disclosure framework for the notes in financial statements, and Barker et al. 
(2013) point at two themes for further development. First, the diagnosis of the problem 
needs to be developed; for example, there is not much support in prior research that 
information overload constitutes a significant problem for users. Second, Barker et al. 
(2013, p. 1) stress the need for the framework to better accommodate the context within 
which financial statement disclosures are used. The IASB (2017) DP has a broader 
scope than the EFRAG, ANC and FRC (2012) discussion paper, but the issues with 
regard to diagnosing the disclosure problem, and considering the context of users, 
remain, and accordingly we will refer to the work by Barker et al. (2013) whenever 
appropriate. The extensions compared to EFRAG, ANC and FRC (2012), and the 
corresponding work of the current FRSC working group, are described in the paragraph 
below. 
 
The DP (IASB, 2017) includes eight sections with questions for comment letter 
submitters and the Board’s preliminary views on most issues. The current paper has the 
corresponding structure with eight sections related to the DP and one additional 
concluding section. Section 1 addresses the ‘disclosure problem’ and refers to the 
perceived problems of users to find relevant information as many disclosures are, 
arguably, non-entity-specific but boilerplate text from IFRS Standards of little 
relevance. However, whether this is actually the users’ perceptions or rather the 
preparers’ view must be considered, and, in addition, even if the users find some 
disclosures irrelevant, the actions taken to deal with the problem may reduce the 
disclosures further than first intended.1 Section 2 of the DP deals with principles of 
effective communication, which at first sight would seem to be somewhat out of scope 
for the IASB, as they are very general in nature and go beyond financial reporting it 
would seem closely linked to compliance and enforcement. There are seven principles 
(IASB, 2017, p. 21): the information provided should be (1) entity-specific; (2) 
described as simply and directly as possible; (3) organised in a way that highlights 
important matters; (4) linked when relevant to other information in the financial 
statements; (5) not duplicated unnecessarily;2 (6) provided in a way that optimises 
comparability among entities and across reporting periods without compromising the 
usefulness of the information; and (7) provided in a format that is appropriate for that 
type of information. It goes without saying that adhering to the principles will improve 
disclosures, but they are general, somewhat vague and involve trade-offs, e.g., being 
 
entity-specific while optimising comparability. For these principles to be successfully 
implemented, entities would seem to need to disregard any incentives to hide 
information and some Board members also note that these principles would be difficult 
to audit and enforce (ibid., p. 22). The third section addresses the roles of the primary 
financial statements and notes, where some key issues concern what is meant by 
‘primary’, what makes the four selected statements (statements on financial position, 
financial performance, changes in equity and cash flows) primary and the role of the 
notes in relation to the primary financial statements. Section 4 concerns the location of 
information, where the DP proposes that certain information required by IFRS 
Standards may be located outside the financial statements and, in contrast, it should not 
be prohibited to include non-IFRS information in the financial statements in order to 
distinguish it from information necessary to comply with IFRS Standards. Section 5 
deals with the use of performance measures in financial statements and in this section 
the DP discusses, among other things, what will be required for entities to present 
EBITDA and EBIT subtotals, and unusual items, in the statement of financial 
performance. Section 6 refers to the disclosure of accounting policies, where the DP 
suggests that general principles are needed and discusses alternative locations of 
accounting policy disclosures and significant judgements and assumptions.  Section 7 
pertains to the idea of identifying a central set of disclosure objectives. The DP 
identifies and evaluates two methods, one based on financial statement elements, 
method A (the entity’s assets, liabilities, equity, income and expenses) and another 
method based on the entity’s activities targeting prospects of future net cash inflows 
and accountability aspects, method B. Finally, in Section 8 the New Zealand 
Accounting Standards Board staff’s approach to disclosure is presented. It is a two-tier 
approach, according to which entities first provide summary information subject to a 
materiality judgement (tier 1 disclosures), followed by an assessment of whether it is 
necessary to provide additional information (tier 2 disclosures). The assessment is 
based on the relative importance of the information to the entity and the amount of 
judgement involved in accounting for the item or the transaction.  
 
The closing section (Section 9) includes some concluding remarks. As this paper was 
developed in order to respond to specific questions asked in the IASB (2017) DP, the 
paper will not be limited to a review of prior research but naturally also include opinions 
expressed by the FRSC members who contributed to the comment letter and to this 
paper. 
 
 
1. The Disclosure Problem – Relevant and Irrelevant Information 
 
The DP starts out by describing the ‘disclosure problem’ (DP, 1.5) and relies heavily 
on the concept of ‘relevance’, i.e. that the information is capable of making a difference 
to primary users in their decision making. The problem is divided into three components 
– ‘not relevant enough information’, ‘irrelevant information’ and ‘ineffective 
communication of the information provided’ (dealt with in Section 3). This way of 
formulating the disclosure problem emerged as a consequence of how influential 
stakeholders (mainly preparers) had recently described the problem, i.e. in terms 
information overload and the widespread use of checklist approaches by auditors and 
regulators, which caused entities costs for producing presumably irrelevant disclosures 
(e.g., ICAS/NZICA, 2011). Accordingly, the first two components of the disclosure 
problem suggest that too much irrelevant information is produced so that relevant 
 
information is not considered and that the provision of relevant financial statement 
information must be enhanced, however, this formulation of the problem is problematic 
in that it has no general solution that will benefit all primary users. 
 
Financial statements are used in many decision contexts and different items will be 
perceived as relevant to different primary users in different situations. In addition, it 
does not have to pertain to a specific disclosure item, but could refer to a combination 
of various disclosures, or a combination of information pieces provided at different 
points in time. Thus, requiring entities to present more disclosures, perceived by the 
standard setter as reflecting what is ‘generally relevant’, will still not be enough to all 
primary users. In contrast, it cannot be a priori determined what pieces of information 
that will always be considered irrelevant by a specific primary user. 
 
How will the standard setter know what disclosures are relevant to the primary users? 
It is not possible to know as it depends on the situation at hand, and therefore standards 
need to adapt to users’ decision contexts in order to stay relevant. The DP tends to argue 
that there is some general solution to the first two components of the disclosure 
problem, however, the context-dependency of ‘relevance’ and ‘irrelevance’, implies the 
problem will have different solutions depending on the specific conditions at hand (see 
also Section 7). The DP does not address context-dependency; however, the Board has 
dealt with the problem in connection with specific IFRS Standards. IFRS 8 (Operating 
Segments) is a good example of this, where the idea is that users are provided with the 
same financial statement information about the operating segments as the entity’s chief 
operating decision-maker (CODM), regardless of what particular items the CODM 
considers relevant. The information that is relevant to the CODM should be relevant to 
the primary users – a solution that truly addresses the first part of the disclosure 
problem. However, the CODM-specific feature means that the information becomes 
less comparable across entities and therefore less useful to primary users. This implies 
a conflict between entity-specific relevance and comparability across entities. 
 
IFRS Standards aim at portraying economic phenomena in ways that fulfil accounting 
requirements of both relevance and faithful representation. When it comes to 
disclosures, there is a strong emphasis on the distinction between relevance and 
irrelevance in the DP, whereas faithful representation is not much referred to. As an 
illustration, there are 44 references to relevance in the DP compared to 10 references to 
faithful representation. However, a one-sided emphasis on relevance is not warranted 
with regard to disclosures as primary users would be expected to consider the ‘package’ 
of information received. Some pieces of disclosures will represent hard and neutral data 
that may not be capable of making a difference in the decisions by themselves, whereas 
other parts of the package will be judgemental information (management estimates) 
perceived as less reliable. Taken together, the sum of the pieces may constitute relevant 
information with a reasonable level of reliability that the user can assess and base 
decisions on. 
 
The argument made that financial statements include too much irrelevant information 
is often put forward by preparers, who emphasise the high costs of producing financial 
statement information. In contrast, Barker et al. (2013) summarised the results of an 
academic literature review on disclosure overload from a user perspective, as follows 
(pp. 2–3): 
 
 
‘…[The] academic literature indicates that the market, as a whole, reacts positively 
to increased disclosure, notwithstanding that individuals may feel overloaded. 
Positive market reactions to more disclosure have been extensively illustrated in the 
literature. Overall, the literature supports the need for effective organisation and 
communication of disclosures, while providing mixed evidence with respect to the 
question of disclosure overload, with a key consideration being whether the focus is 
on the individual investor or on the market as a whole. Many studies identify 
particular disclosure items, and show positive effects for firms providing the 
identified disclosures. This indicates that more disclosure is better than less. A word 
of caution is necessary however, as it is difficult to obtain ‘negative’ findings in 
research, such as proving that a particular disclosure item is not useful. For this 
reason, such results are not seen in research, and conclusive evidence on disclosure 
overload is hard to find.’ 
 
Actions against the disclosure of irrelevant information have been taken by the IASB 
in connection with the revision of IAS 1 regarding materiality and the Materiality 
Practice Statement. Regulators such as the FRC commit to concerns about disclosure 
overload, and encourage companies to remove immaterial information so that company 
accounts become clear and concise. For example, the FRC provides a case description 
in its 2015 Corporate Reporting Review (FRC, 2015) where a company has decreased 
its amount of seemingly irrelevant information by removing the detailed disclosures 
required by IFRS 2. The disclosures are viewed as immaterial as the share-based 
payment charge was less than 1% of profit before tax and approximately 70% of the 
group materiality disclosed in the auditor’s report. Mechanical thresholds of this kind 
for separate items such as share-based payment may make entities even more focused 
on being below the quantified thresholds and to have a piecemeal approach towards 
disclosures. In particular, poor disclosers may abuse the profit- and group materiality 
proxies through instrumental application. It does not seem likely that what makes 
information capable of influencing primary users’ decisions is arbitrarily quantified 
thresholds for separate items. Investors might find it relevant to learn about what 
conditions apply for managers who receive share-based payment even though the 
amount expensed was low in the current period.  
 
Barker et al. (2013) discuss how well IFRS disclosure requirements currently work. 
They relate their views primarily to problems of enforceability (p. 8):  
 
‘To some extent, the enforceability issue is already apparent in how current 
accounting standards are applied in practice. IAS 1 Presentation of Financial 
Statements, for example, states that specific disclosures required under IFRS do not 
have to be presented, if they are immaterial (paragraph 31). Regarding disclosure of 
accounting policies, the standard says that they are especially useful when they relate 
to areas, where there are alternatives within IFRS (paragraph 119), or for non-
regulated areas (paragraph 121). In conclusion, IAS 1 encourages relevant, entity-
specific information, and does not require standardized non-relevant information, 
yet in practice that is what is often provided. Thus, an important reason for the 
disclosure overload seems to be how IFRS is currently implemented, rather than the 
requirements in the standards. For example, enforcement agencies require the 
inclusion of many specific disclosure items, thus taking a rules-based approach in 
the enforcement action. A possible reason is that it is much easier to enforce such 
detailed requirements than more general disclosure principles. This, in turn, makes 
 
it very difficult for preparers to follow principle 12.3 Unfortunately there is not much 
existing research on such enforcement issues.’ 
 
As one of its questions, the IASB asks for comments on the idea to develop a general 
disclosure standard with a set of disclosure principles. We find that there are already 
principles of disclosure in IFRS Standards; IAS 1 includes principles of disclosure of a 
more general nature and the more recent area-specific IFRS Standards tend to adopt a 
more principles-based approach to disclosures, in some cases even separate principles-
based disclosure standards such as IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosures) and 
IFRS 12 (Disclosure of Interests in Other Entities). However, these standards appear to 
be very difficult to enforce, and enforcement bodies may turn away from the principles 
in favour of specific requirements and checklists. Still, principles of disclosure together 
with specific requirements that logically support the principles and strong enforcement, 
appear to be the best option going forward. In particular, we believe more attention 
should be paid to the context of users of disclosures. In the DP, the IASB tends to target 
the ‘best-in-class’ disclosers, however, academic research shows that there will be 
contexts where entities have incentives not to disclose. For such poor disclosers, more 
emphasis on principles and lower emphasis on specific disclosure requirements may 
not, in fact, serve the primary users well (see Hellman, Carenys & Moya, 2018). 
 
 
2. Principles of Effective Communication  
 
Section 2 of the DP, discusses principles of effective communication that entities should 
apply when preparing financial statements. Recent academic studies suggest that 
investors and other stakeholders request that the story they are told about the entity’s 
financial situation should be presented in a clear and authentic way (Paananen, Renders 
& Blomkvist, 2016; Cascino et al., 2014; Armstrong, Guay & Weber, 2010; Beaver, 
McNichols & Rhie, 2005). In order to improve communication effectiveness, we also 
need more knowledge about who the users are and what they demand. A recent study 
of who uses annual reports, based on U.S. data, Drake, Quinn & Thornock (2017) find 
significant variation across users based on various demographics. For example, they 
find that education is a major driver of financial statements usage. We believe there is 
a need for more research on identifying user groups in more sophisticated manners and 
to better understand their demands and actual usage. This would appear to be an 
important component when working on making financial communication more 
effective. 
 
According to Bertomeu & Cheynel (2013), financial reporting is, arguably, one of the 
most heavily regulated areas of business activity. Still, accounting standards fail to 
promote socially desirable levels of disclosure (e.g. Rutherford, 2011). Disclosures are 
supposed to explain how the company’s accounting policies have been applied, 
emphasising relevance and entity-specific aspects. In addition, entities need adequate 
communication channels (e.g. investor/analysist meetings) and ways of structuring and 
presenting the financial information so that users are able to make judgements and 
decisions based on successful navigation through the financial statements. 
Recent research tends to support the idea that additional disclosures should be linked, 
when relevant, to other information in the financial statements or to other parts of the 
annual report. This involves a need for improved navigation through the financial 
statements. Several studies support the assumption that individual users of annual 
 
reports are increasingly likely to experience problems in searching and locating the 
information (Smith & Taffler, 2000; Hodge, Kennedy & Maines, 2004). Another 
important issue raised in recent research relates to considering the entity’s age and 
volume of its private information. Thus, for entities with a large amount of private 
information and who are relatively young, disclosures are considered to be more 
important (Francis, Nanda & Olsson, 2008; Easley & O’Hara, 2004). These findings 
support the principle included in the DP which suggests that the information should be 
entity-specific. In this context we believe that the information tailored to an entity’s 
own circumstances is more useful than generic, ‘boilerplate’ language or information 
that is readily available outside the financial statements. 
 
In general, more disclosures tend to reduce the information asymmetry between 
preparers and users (cf. Akerlof, 1970; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). In the empirical 
literature, there is generally a positive reaction of the market towards increased 
disclosure (Barker et al., 2013). However, more information comes at a cost and it tends 
to be harder to measure the costs of proposed standards than costs of existing ones (e.g. 
Gross & Königsgruber, 2012). It is thus important that the initiatives aiming at more 
effective communication are not simply transformed into requests for more disclosures.  
 
The DP asks if the Board should develop principles of effective communication that 
entities should apply when preparing financial statements. The question is accompanied 
by seven key principles of effective communication (listed in Appendix 1). At first sight 
it would seem to be somewhat out of scope for an accounting standard setter to prescribe 
such principles, as they are very general in nature and go beyond financial reporting. 
They would also involve challenges with regard to compliance, auditing and 
enforcement (acknowledged by some of the Board members in the DP, p. 22). However, 
we believe that developing principles of effective communication can help and motivate 
entities to improve their disclosures by clarifying, for example, how to deal with trade-
offs between entity-specific and comparable information. All of the suggested 
principles seem relevant, but more work remains in order to clarify the trade-offs, for 
example, with regard to the principle stating that the information should be entity-
specific (1) and the principle aiming at optimising comparability (6). Even though 
entity-specific information is required, materiality aspects make these requirements 
difficult to enforce. We suggest that in order to deal with this trade-off some minimum 
level of specific disclosure items is required in order to ensure that primary users 
receive a minimum amount of comparable information also from the poor disclosers 
(cf. Hellman et al., 2018). For the principles to be successfully implemented, entities 
would seem to need to be in good faith and have no incentives to hide information.  
 
The suggested principles of effective communication and the DP’s view on disclosures 
in general represent a more user-oriented approach towards disclosures than today and 
it is important that users understand and are able to successfully utilise the disclosures 
to be provided under the new disclosure regime. The Board may wish to consider 
building a detailed mapped process in order to evaluate the potential improvements 
achieved for users in terms of economic decision making, understandability and more 
diligent use of information. In this context, the use of technology should be explicitly 
considered. The speed and volume of information processing increase continuously and 
investors will need tools that enable them to find and consider the information in a 
timely manner. These tools may not be appropriately matched with the gradually 
increasing information flow from entities and information intermediaries. We suggest 
 
that the provided framework in the DP is supported by a strategy on how to improve 
the effectiveness of communication process (an example is provided in Appendix 2). 
This is supported by the existing academic evidence on challenges that individual users 
experience when trying to search for and locate relevant information (Janvrin & Masha, 
2010; Miller, 2010). 
 
The DP discusses whether the principles should be prescribed in a general disclosure 
standard or issued as non-mandatory guidance. There is analytical research in the area 
of disclosures, however, there is a literature gap regarding the choice between 
mandatory standards and non-mandatory guidance (e.g., Bertomeu & Cheynel, 2013). 
A problem with making the principles of effective communication mandatory is that 
principle-based disclosure requirements appear to be more difficult to apply, audit and 
enforce than principle-based standards concerning classification, recognition and 
measurement (Barker et al., 2013). Still, entities will have incentives to communicate 
effectively with their investors even if the principles are not mandatory. There is a need 
for more research in this area, for example, it would be interesting to learn about the 
effects of the adoption of the ‘practice statement’ solution that the IASB chose with 
regard to materiality judgements.  
 
Global standards aim to increase international comparability (e.g. Brunsson & 
Jacobsson, 2000), however, in order for global harmonisation to succeed a network of 
actors must be actively involved (standard setters, auditing and consulting experts, 
translators, stock exchanges, etc.). Prior research on the introduction of ISA, 
International Standards on Auditing, points at the importance of the network of actors 
involved in defining principles of how to operate in accordance with international 
standards (Mennicken, 2008; see also Gendron, Cooper & Townley, 2007). This also 
relates directly to how the information is communicated. We believe the experiences 
from introducing ISA are relevant to the IASB’s work on improving communication of 
information based on IFRS Standards.  
 
 
3. The Roles of the Primary Financial Statements and Notes 
 
Section 3 of the DP discusses the need of describing the roles of the different 
components of the financial statements and how those roles meet the objective of 
financial statements. Much of the discussion in section 3 concerns the ‘primary 
financial statements’, a term introduced by the IASB in 2013 in a DP on completing 
and revising the Conceptual Framework, however, this DP did not explain what makes 
a particular set of financial statements primary or provide any principle or concept to 
guide decision-making (Barker et al., 2014). The current DP opens up the term 
‘primary’ by specifying the term as a complete set of statements including the 
statements of financial position, financial performance, changes in equity and cash 
flows as well as by describing the role of the primary financial statements. Despite this, 
we argue that a more in-depth explanation is still missing in the current DP. 
 
It should be noted that the Board is undertaking a project on Primary Financial 
Statements with the primary aim of improving the existing guidance on financial 
statement presentation, restricted to the statements of financial performance and cash 
flows. The scope of the Primary Financial Statements project is the structure and 
content of the abovementioned statements, exploring issues related to the need for 
 
additional subtotals, various options for presentation of income and expenses, use of 
performance measures and classification of the cash effects of interest and dividends, 
among others. In contrast, the main objective of the DP is to identify disclosure issues 
and develop new, or clarify existing, disclosure principles. The purpose of this section 
is to discuss, on a more general level and consistent with the DP, the roles of the primary 
financial statements and notes. Thus, this discussion aims at adding insights and 
comments related to the identification and description of the role of the primary 
financial statements and notes as well as the implications of those roles. 
 
Regarding the four statements of financial position, financial performance, changes in 
equity and cash flows included in the term primary financial statements, we note that 
the DP does not prescribe whether any of the four statements is more important than 
the other. In line with previous scholars (e.g. Brouwer, Faramarzi & Hoogendoorn, 
2014), we support this approach, as we regard the four different statements to be of 
equal importance. The Balance Sheet approach, widely referred to in IFRS research 
articles (e.g. Abela et al., 2014; Brouwer et al., 2014) and embraced by the Conceptual 
Framework as the leading approach in standards development (Abela et al., 2014), gives 
the statement of financial position conceptual primacy compared to the other statements 
and it is therefore important, we believe, for the Board to clearly state that the four 
different statements are of equal importance.  
 
The DP (paragraph 3.18) points out that various stakeholder groups may disagree on 
what should be included in the primary financial statements. In particular, the statement 
of cash flows has been debated, and not surprisingly, as the IASB in its Conceptual 
Framework has not identified the statement of cash flows as a separate element of the 
financial statements. Scholars have, however, found support for the usefulness of the 
statement of cash flows. For example, Orpurt & Zang (2009) explore the impact of 
choosing either the direct or the indirect method for cash flow statements on future 
earnings response coefficients and conclude that the improved stock price 
informativeness of the direct method provides investors with a useful basis for 
estimating future earnings and cash flows. Based on a UK study, Akbar, Shah & Stark 
(2017) find strong support for the assertion that cash flows can have incremental value 
relevance relative to either earnings or funds flows. In a similar vein, Farshadfar & 
Monem (2013) provide Australian evidence that disaggregating operating cash flow 
into its components enhances the predictive ability of aggregate operating cash flow in 
forecasting future cash flows. As we fully agree to the idea of including the statement 
of cash flows among the primary financial statements, we propose that the Board would 
consider a change in the Conceptual Framework to not cause a conflict between 
standards and framework. 
 
As a minor detail, we discuss the term primary financial statements. While we agree 
that the term primary financial statements is commonly used in practice and regard it 
as the best option of those among which the Board made its choice, the term ‘primary’ 
does raise the expectation of there being another set of statements, a secondary or 
subsequent set. This is also quite understandable, as the normal dictionary meaning of 
primary includes the concept of i) ‘of chief importance’ and ii) ‘earliest in time or 
order’. Therefore, we are somewhat hesitant towards the new term. An alternative term 
that we believe should be considered is the term ‘key’, a term missing among the 
various options considered by the Board. A few years ago, the IAASB chose to use the 
term ‘key’ in the regulation on the Independent Auditor’s Report (IAASB, 2015), where 
 
key audit matters (KAM) represent the areas in the audit of the financial statements of 
most significant auditor attention. Thus, similarly to the KAM concept in auditing, the 
term key in the financial reporting context would represent those areas in financial 
reporting, which most significantly capture stakeholders’ attention, i.e. the primary 
financial statements. To our knowledge the term ‘key financial statements’ is not used 
elsewhere in the standards. Admittedly, defining what is ‘key’ and ‘non-key’ involve a 
problem similar to defining what is ‘primary’ and ‘non-primary’, however, the term 
‘key’ would in our opinion be easier to understand and use as it is commonly applied 
in other financial reporting settings, such as key audit matters (KAM) and key financial 
ratios. 
 
Building on the Conceptual Framework, the DP sets out the role of the primary financial 
statements to provide a structured and comparable summary of an entity’s recognised 
assets, liabilities, equity, income and expenses. While the role as such is described at a 
very generic level, we agree to the role. We would, however, like to point out that the 
word ‘structured’ may be misunderstood to imply a prescribed, specific structure, while 
instead the company currently may choose its own way of presentation, classification, 
aggregation and layout as regards presentation of information. These choices usually 
imply an entity-specific presentation in many ways. Scholars (e.g. Maines & McDaniel, 
2000) and practitioners agree that presentation format and location of information 
matter. Increased comparability of financial statement information is likely to be 
beneficial to users. For example, the overall finding of Neel (2017, p. 658) is that cross-
country accounting comparability played an important role in the previously 
documented economic benefits that accrued to 2005 mandatory IFRS adopters. We 
therefore welcome the emphasis on increased comparability of IFRS financial 
statements which we believe will also facilitate further digitalisation of the statements.  
 
The DP sets out the role of the primary financial statements by specifying what the 
information is useful for. In our opinion, the text appears, however, somewhat repetitive 
in paras 3.22 and 3.22a, with the only variation in the text being the term overview 
instead of summary. The text reads:  
 
‘…the role of the primary financial statements is to provide a structured and 
comparable summary of an entity’s recognized assets, liabilities, equity, income 
and expenses, which is useful for: (a) obtaining an overview of the entity’s assets, 
liabilities, equity, income and expenses;…’.  
 
While the underlying meaning is clear, i.e. the summary is useful for obtaining an 
overview, this ‘phrase’ seems rather simple and obvious. We also question, could the 
two terms overview and summary be considered synonyms by some users? Thus, we 
argue that paragraph 3.22a might be improved and made more specific regarding what 
the summary is useful for. While it may be too specific to add that the overview is 
useful for various stakeholders in different ways, among others for decision-making 
and forecasting of future cash flows, we ask for some clarification on this role. 
  
Without doubt, one role of the primary financial statements is related to providing 
comparable information to the users of the financial statements. As described in the 
Conceptual Framework, comparability is one of the enhancing qualitative 
characteristics, which is considered improving the usefulness of information for various 
stakeholders. Previous research has also made attempts to study the effects of IFRS 
 
adoption on comparability. From a capital market perspective, Barth, Landsman, Lang 
& Williams (2012) document that IFRS adoption is associated with a significant 
increase in the comparability of financial statements across IFRS firms and a size-and-
industry-matched sample of US firms. In contrast, Kvaal & Nobes (2012) express 
doubts about whether comparability has been achieved, as they find that national 
patterns of IFRS practice continue after IFRS implementation. Brüggemann, Hitz & 
Sellhorn (2013) conclude that there is conflicting evidence on whether the 
comparability objectives of the IFRS Standards have been achieved and calls for more 
research in this area. 
 
The DP also points to the role of the primary financial statement in providing a useful 
summary for identifying items or areas within the financial statements about which the 
users may seek additional information in the notes. We also agree to this role but would 
like to add that the fulfilment of this role may be dependent on the quality of the 
presentation of financial statements. For example, a statement of financial performance 
presented in line with the minimum requirements does not, in our opinion, provide the 
users with much useful information for identifying important items or areas of interest 
in the notes. The links between the financial statements and the notes are emphasised 
in accounting education (Ruhl & Smith, 2013), but there is a need for more research on 
how these links should best be designed in order to serve the users of financial 
information in practice.  
 
The DP also lists a number of points to further set out the implications of the role of the 
primary financial statements. Overall, we find the list of points useful and accurate, 
although some of the points seem rather obvious. For example, scholars have largely 
found support for the fact that the information in the primary financial statements is 
more prominent than information in the notes (see discussion in e.g. Brouwer et al., 
2014). Despite this, we believe that some preparers of financial information may need 
clarifications. Only paragraph 3.24e is in our opinion somewhat unclear and would need 
further clarification. The DP sets out that the preparer should consider the role of the 
primary financial statements when making the decision about whether to disclose the 
information as a separate line item in the primary financial statements or aggregated 
and included in other items. We ask for some examples to help the preparer make this 
decision.  
 
Section 3 is related to Section 4 of the Discussion Paper, including principles on 
location of information, which is discussed in the following section. Further, this 
section is related to other projects within the Disclosure Initiative, among others the 
Materiality Practice Statement project. Therefore, we shall here raise a limited number 
of aspects as follows. 
 
Regarding the notes, the DP defines them as that part of the financial statements other 
than the primary financial statements (paragraph 3.30). While various studies indicate 
that notes to financial statements are indeed important to professional investors (e.g. 
Olbert, 1994; Gassen & Schwedler, 2010), they also indicate that investors do not 
perform detailed analyses based on the information provided in the notes (e.g. Barker, 
2000). Also, Clor-Proell & Maines (2014) find that public company managers both 
choose more effortful approaches and exhibit less strategic bias under recognition (in 
the financial statements) than disclosure (in the notes).  
 
 
The DP (paragraph 3.28) sets out that the role of the notes is to: (a) provide further 
information necessary to disaggregate, reconcile and explain the items recognised in 
the primary financial statements, and (b) supplement the primary financial statements 
with other information that is necessary to meeting the objective of financial statements. 
We fully agree with this role. The DP further prescribes that explanatory information 
includes information that disaggregates and reconciles line items in the primary 
financial statements, describes the nature of such line items and provides information 
about methods, assumptions and judgements as well as changes in the aforementioned, 
which are used to recognise and measure those line items. Examples of supplementary 
information include information about the nature and extent of an entity’s unrecognised 
elements and about an entity’s exposure to various types of risks, for example market 
risk or credit risk. We believe these examples and explanations at large are consistent 
with current practice but still provide some clarification for preparers of the financial 
statements. Contemporary research also suggests that managers provide supplemental 
information to mitigate the negative effects of complex financial statements on the 
information environment (e.g. Bagnoli & Watts, 2007; Guay, Samuels & Taylor, 2016).  
 
Finally, the Board notes that companies have problems deciding what information 
should be presented in the primary financial statements and what should be disclosed 
in the notes. It has been suggested, that those problems are due to the inconsistent use 
of the terms ‘present’ and ‘disclose’ in IFRS Standards. Despite this, the DP does not 
prescribe the meaning of the terms ‘present’ and ‘disclose’ but agrees to be more 
explicit in the future when using the terms so that the subsequently emerging IFRS 
Standards will specify the intended location as either ‘in the primary financial 
statements’ or ‘in the notes’. We believe this will be very useful and diminish current 
disclosure problems having occurred in practice. We also propose that the Board in 
subsequent revisions of existing IFRS Standards will add similar specifications of 
intended locations.  
 
 
4. The Location of Information 
 
Section 4 in the DP starts out from the observation from practice that duplication and 
fragmentation of information can make financial statements and annual reports more 
difficult to analyse and understand and that the Board should consider placing some 
required information outside the financial statements and some ‘non-IFRS information’ 
within the financial statements. Prior academic literature has examined whether the 
market treats disclosed financial statement information as less reliable compared to 
information recognised in the body of the financial statements. In efficient markets with 
minimal information-processing costs, one would not expect the accounting treatment 
(i.e. recognition versus disclosure) of the same economic event to matter. However, if 
there are (1) costs of processing information (Barth, Clinch & Shibano, 2003), (2) 
systematic biases in how investors process information, such as limited attention 
(Hirshleifer & Teoh, 2003), or (3) differences in perceived reliability of recognised 
versus disclosed items, this choice can matter to users (Ahmed, Kilic & Lobo, 2006). 
 
From a standard-setting perspective, there are trade-offs between recognition and 
disclosure as regards the accounting treatment of many items (e.g. contingent 
liabilities), and how these trade-offs affect users’ decisions has been an issue of 
considerable interest to standard setters, practicing professionals and academic 
 
researchers. Many studies have analysed differences in capital-market outcomes 
associated with recognised versus disclosed accounting amounts (Bernard & Schipper, 
1994; Schipper, 2007). Early studies establish that both components are priced, 
although they yield different capital market outcomes (e.g. Landsman, 1986; Harris & 
Ohlson, 1987; Beaver, Eger, Ryan & Wolfson, 1989; Barth, 1991). The literature 
proposes two potentially complementary explanations (Bernard & Schipper, 1994; 
Schipper, 2007; Bratten, Choudhary & Schipper, 2013): differential reliability and 
information processing. Differential reliability suggests that disclosed amounts are 
appropriately viewed by participants in an efficient market as having lower reliability, 
whereas information processing suggests that capital market participants face higher 
information processing costs for disclosed relative to recognised amounts, which can 
vary with the firm’s information environment and disclosure quality, as well as 
investors’ competence, cognition, and attention.  
 
Several studies present evidence consistent with differential reliability, (Davis-Friday, 
Liu & Mittelstaedt, 2004; Choudhary, 2011; Bratten et al., 2013), whereas few studies 
explicitly examine the information processing cost explanation. Those few studies 
provide evidence that there is no consensus that the pricing discount observed for 
disclosed items relates principally (or entirely) to lower reliability (Yu, 2013; Michels, 
2015). More recently, studies examine both causes of these differences and find that 
reliability and information processing costs provide complementary explanations for 
observed pricing discounts assessed on disclosed accounting amounts (Müller, Riedl & 
Sellhorn, 2015). 
 
Therefore, in light of recent academic evidence, we support the Board’s preliminary 
view that a general disclosure standard should include a principle that information 
necessary to comply with IFRS Standards can be provided outside the financial 
statements if such information meets the requirements in DP paragraphs 4.9(a)–(c) – in 
general. We believe that this would reduce duplication of information and further 
support the proposed principles of effective communication that entities should apply 
when preparing financial statements. However, we are concerned that because there is 
no definition of annual report included in the standard(s),4 this could mean different 
things in different reporting environments. Academic literature has shown persistent 
country differences in financial reporting, resulting in unintended consequences after 
standard implementation (Nobes, 2013; Forst, 2014; Felski, 2017) and thus, there is a 
risk that the requirements will be interpreted differently in different jurisdictions.  We, 
like the Board, are also concerned about the excessive use of cross-referencing, which 
could reduce the usefulness of the financial statements.  
 
Due to the risk of variation in what is meant by an annual report around the world, we 
believe the Board should consider developing a definition aligned with ISA 720 to 
ensure a consistent definition for both preparers and auditors. Such an initiative will 
have to consider of issues of jurisdiction and may require collaboration with national 
standard setters. 
 
Some listed firms (in countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom) are required 
to disclose executive and/or director compensation in a report. This disclosure may be 
mandated by legislation or exchange rules. A firm should be able to cross-reference 
executive/director compensation information to either a legally mandated report or 
 
exchange report and still be able to comply with the criteria in DP paragraphs 4.9(a)–
(c). 
 
The DP also asks whether or not a general disclosure standard should prohibit an entity 
from including information in its financial statements that it has identified as ‘non-IFRS 
information’.  In our opinion, the Board should not prohibit an entity from including 
‘non-IFRS information’ in its financial statements, given that this additional 
information may be relevant for a better understanding of the financial statements. 
Thus, this ‘non-IFRS information’ may be aligned with IAS 1. Paragraph 4.27 refers to 
examples of unaudited information, ‘summary measures of an entity’s financial 
performance, financial position or cash flows’, and paragraph 5.12 mentions that ‘most 
concerns cited by users of financial statements relate to the use of performance 
measures in the statement(s) of financial performance’. However, studies on the 
inclusion of non-IFRS earnings measures (also known as non-GAAP or alternative 
earnings measures) show that these measures are mostly informative. 
 
In the UK, Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 3, issued in 1993, allowed (but did not 
require) firms to disclose additional earnings per share to the one that was required by 
the standard. If these additional measures were disclosed, then firms had to present 
them consistently over time, reconcile to the FRS3 measure and give the measures as 
much emphasis as the measures calculated according to the standard. Research on the 
disclosure of these alternative measures is relevant to our discussion, given they are 
located in the financial statements. Three studies analyse alternative measures in the 
UK, before the adoption of IFRS. While Walker & Louvari (2003) study the 
determinants of disclosure of non-GAAP measures by quoted companies, Choi, Lin, 
Walker & Young (2007) examine the adjustments made both by managers and analysts 
in their construction of non-IFRS and ‘street earnings’ measures, respectively, and 
identify the source and properties of the items where there is no agreement. Consistent 
with the general view on non-IFRS disclosures (as discussed above) they find that most 
of the adjustments made by managers are valuable, although there is a subset of 
management adjustments that are consistent with an attempt to mislead investors. 
Finally, Choi & Young (2015) document a strong positive association between non-
GAAP EPS disclosure and the magnitude of transitory items. This evidence is 
consistent with a desire to inform capital markets.  
 
Evidence collected from the disclosure of non-IFRS measures in South Africa is also 
relevant, as firms listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange are required to 
disclose in their financial statements their ‘headline earnings’ per share, in addition to 
the earnings per share measures required by IAS 33 (from October 2000 onwards). 
Firms are also required to include, in their financial statements, a reconciliation between 
non-IFRS and IFRS earnings, which is subject to audit. Venter, Cahan & Emanuel 
(2013) assess the persistence of (i) the adjustments made in the creation of non-IFRS, 
(ii) earnings accruals, and (iii) cash flows. Then, they analyse whether these persistence 
levels are reflected in price and conclude that investors price earnings components ‘in 
a manner that is consistent with the actual levels of persistence of these components.’ 
In a second study, Venter, Emanuel & Cahan (2014) find that these mandated non-IFRS 
earnings are more informative than the IFRS earnings, using data from 2002 to 2009.  
 
However, one must acknowledge the evidence collected on how specific methods of 
disclosure of non-IFRS earnings can alter investors’ perceptions of firms’ performance. 
 
We are referring to the situations where non-IFRS earnings measures (i) meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts when IFRS figures are below expectations, (ii) are created via the 
adjustments of recurring items, or (iii) are given more prominence than IFRS measures. 
Evidence of such behaviours in Europe has been associated with directors’ 
compensation (Isidro & Marques, 2013), the institutional and economic setting where 
firms operate (Isidro & Marques, 2015), and the use of impression management in press 
releases (Guillamon-Saorin, Isidro & Marques, 2017). This evidence leads us to the 
discussion of how important it is to create a set of requirements on how non-IFRS 
information may be disclosed. The aim of these requirements is to reduce the 
probability of such information misleading investors (mainly the less sophisticated 
ones). 
 
DP paragraphs 4.38(a)-(c) suggest that if an entity discloses non-IFRS information it 
should: 
 
a) Identify clearly such information as not being prepared in accordance with IFRS 
Standards and, if applicable, as unaudited; 
b) Provide a list of such information, together with the statement of compliance 
with IFRS Standards; and 
c) Explain why the information is useful and has been included in the financial 
statements 
 
Requirement (a) will eliminate the current difficulty of identifying the information that 
is not consistent with the standards. In fact, one of the problems at hand when collecting 
non-IFRS earnings information that is voluntarily disclosed, is the lack of consistency 
of the labels used to classify the measures, both across firms and over time. 
Furthermore, identifying the information that has not been audited will address the 
concerns mentioned in paragraph 4.27.  
 
Requirement (b) will help users of financial statements to correctly identify the 
measures that are not based on IFRS. However, we feel this requirement falls a little 
short of its potential. In fact, we believe this list should also include the definition (or 
formula for calculation) of these measures. This is because the lack of consistency does 
not only apply to the labels used, it also exists in the way firms calculate their measures. 
As regards non-IFRS earnings, this was initially mentioned in a report by EFRAG 
(2009). For a recent literature review and analyses on US data, see Black, Christensen, 
Ciesielski & Whipple (2018).  
 
Requirement (c) is aligned with Regulation G, in the US, which also requires this 
explanation. However, there is the risk that firms disclose explanations which are not 
informative and/or too vague. If that is the case, then this requirement will not provide 
any useful information and is superfluous. Take, for example, the justification presented 
by Cisco, in the press release of the last quarter of 2003 (the year when Regulation G 
came into effect): 
 
‘Cisco believes that this presentation of pro forma net income and pro forma net 
income per share provides useful information to management and investors 
regarding certain additional financial and business trends relating to its financial 
condition and results of operations. In addition, Cisco's management uses these 
 
measures for reviewing the financial results of Cisco and for budget planning 
purposes.’ 
 
Finally, the DP also asks about the adequacy or not of prohibiting the inclusion of any 
specific types of additional information in the financial statements. In that regard we 
believe there are certain types of non-IFRS information that should not be included in 
the financial statements. This is because such location of disclosures will not add to 
investors’ understanding of the composition of the figures that are included in the 
statements. This is the case of non-financial measures, like the examples provided in 
paragraph 4.27 (b): market share, staff turnover, and number of units sold per employee. 
 
Another type of non-financial disclosure which recently has been receiving a great deal 
of attention, is disclosures related to corporate social responsibility (which can be seen 
as incorporating information about environmental, social and ethical issues). In fact, a 
report by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA, 2013) states that 
‘the most important sources of non-financial information for investors are 
sustainability/CSR reports and annual reports’. Recent European evidence on the 
importance of such disclosures is documented by DeVilliers & Marques (2016) and in 
Cahan, DeVilliers, Jeter & Standen (2016). However, as far as we know, that type of 
information is never disclosed within the financial statements. 
 
 
5. Use of Performance Measures   
 
In section 5, the DP evaluates the inclusion (in a general disclosure standard) of 
additional requirements regarding fair presentation of performance measures in 
financial statements. One of the questions posed has to do with the presentation of 
EBITDA or EBIT.  As a first step, we agree with the Board’s first preliminary view that 
the Board should clarify that the presentation of EBITDA or EBIT as a subtotal in the 
statement(s) of financial performance complies with IFRS Standards if such subtotals 
are presented in accordance with paragraphs 85–85B of IAS 1. This is particularly 
important as EBITDA is one of the most commonly used performance measures used 
both by preparers and users of accounting information (Cascino et al., 2016; CFA 
Institute, 2016). One usual concern regarding the use of performance measures as 
EBITDA is that users of financial statements are not sure about how they have been 
calculated and, as a result, whether they have been calculated according to IFRS or not. 
The clarification that the EBITDA calculation complies with IFRS will make this 
performance measure much more comparable and trustworthy.  
 
Moreover, this would reduce concerns that have been raised regarding the higher 
prominence that can be given to performance measures if a full non-GAAP income 
statement is used when reconciling to GAAP. In the answer to Question 102.10 of 
SEC’s May 2016 Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations: Non-GAAP Financial 
Measures it is stated that: ‘Presenting a full income statement of non-GAAP measures 
or presenting a full non-GAAP income statement when reconciling non-GAAP 
measures to the most directly comparable GAAP measures’5 is an example of 
disclosures that would cause a non-GAAP measure to be more prominent.  
 
Along these lines, there is research evidence indicating that non-GAAP performance 
measures are highly associated with stock returns (Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen & 
 
Larson, 2003; Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Lougee & Marquardt, 2004); although some 
firms may use these measures opportunistically (Marques, 2010; Brown, Christensen 
& Elliott, 2012; Entwistle, Feltham & Mbagwu, 2005; Black & Christensen, 2009) and 
less sophisticated investors are more likely to be influenced by performance measures 
that are not defined in accounting standards (Frederickson & Miller, 2004; 
Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen & Mergenthaler, 2007; Dilla, Janvrin & Jeffrey, 
2012). Therefore, the clarification regarding EBITDA would help in assuring that less 
sophisticated investors are not being misled by disclosure of performance measures as 
far EBITDA is concerned.  
 
We also agree with the Board’s second preliminary view that the Board should develop 
definitions of, and requirements for, the presentation of unusual or infrequently 
occurring items in the statement(s) of financial performance, as described in DP 
paragraphs 5.26–5.28. Although research has found that, on average, managers use 
performance measures to convey information to the capital markets, there is also 
evidence of managers using these measures in an opportunistic way. As Marques (2017) 
indicates, one of the areas where opportunistic behaviour can be observed is the 
adjustment by managers of items that are non-recurring. This is one of the reasons why 
it is so important to establish requirements regarding unusual or infrequently occurring 
items.  
 
There is empirical evidence regarding how the quality of adjustments (such as those 
made for unusual of infrequently occurring items) made by US companies when 
disclosing performance measures has been affected by the issuance of Regulation G by 
the SEC (SEC Regulation G: 17 CFR §244, SEC [2003]). This offers a comparable 
setting on how the introduction of regulatory requirements has had an impact on 
companies’ disclosure practices. Overall, the evidence suggests that the quality of 
adjustments has improved after the issuance of Regulation G. Heflin & Hsu (2008) 
provide some evidence of a decline in the magnitude of the adjustments, suggesting that 
managers reduced the use of non-GAAP earnings to improve performance perceptions. 
Moreover, when they partition exclusions into special and non-special items, they find 
that the frequency and magnitude of both is reduced by the regulation. Kolev, 
Marquardt & McVay (2008) find that, on average, adjustments are of higher quality 
(i.e. more transitory) after regulation G.6 More recently, Black, Christensen, Kiosse & 
Steffen (2017) study whether Regulation G in the US reduced the incidence of the 
opportunistic use of performance measures (non-GAAP disclosures). They find that 
managers are more cautious when using adjusted earnings measures, as they are less 
likely to make adjustments to exclude recurring items that are incremental to the 
adjustments made by analysts.  
 
Nevertheless, there is also evidence of unintended consequences that may have been 
derived from the regulation. Heflin & Hsu (2008) find that regulation G reduced firms’ 
willingness to use non-GAAP earnings to convey permanent earnings, as the 
restrictions placed by the regulation made the exclusion of transitory income 
components more costly. Kolev et al. (2008) provide evidence that the quality of special 
items adjustments has decreased, suggesting that managers are shifting more recurring 
expenses into special items. Overall, we believe the intended outcomes would 
outperform the unintended consequences, as managers will likely reduce opportunism 
in the use of performance measures if they are subject to greater scrutiny.  
 
 
The DP also asks if the Board should prohibit the use of other terms to describe unusual 
and infrequently occurring items. We believe that this prohibition is not necessary. In 
our opinion, the main issue is not how to name them, but to assure that the company 
provides enough transparent and detailed information in the notes to allow the users of 
financial statements to assess the reasonableness of adjustments. The SEC, ESMA, and 
CFA Institute, for instance, use the term ‘non-recurring’ when referring to items that 
are usually excluded from performance measures (SEC, 2003; ESMA, 2015; CFA 
Institute, 2016). The problem, however, is that when companies disclose the required 
reconciliation, the explanations that are provided about the adjustments that have been 
made are not transparent or granular enough (Ciesielski & Henry, 2017) so as to make 
them understandable. This is particularly important – as a recent study by the CFA 
Institute shows – since it is common practice among analysts to adjust the EBITDA 
number that has been published by firms, in some cases reversing questionable 
adjustments made by management (CFA Institute, 2016).We think, therefore, that more 
emphasis should be put on assuring that the description of the unusual or infrequently 
occurring event is disclosed with sufficient detail in the notes, as considered in DP 
paragraph 5.23.  
  
Another issue discussed by the Board in this section relates to the presentation of 
performance measures and the need for this presentation to follow the requirements set 
out in the Conceptual Framework Exposure Draft (paragraph 2.15). The DP proposes 
that the performance measure shall follow the requirements set in DP 5.34, but refers 
also to DP 5.6 and paragraphs 55 and 85 of IAS 1: 
 
 IAS 1, p. 55: An entity shall present additional line items, headings and 
subtotal in the statement of financial position when such presentation is 
relevant to an understanding of the entity’s financial position; 
 
 IAS 1, p. 85: An entity shall present additional line items, headings and 
subtotal in the statement of comprehensive income and the separate income 
statement (if presented), when such presentation is relevant to an 
understanding of the entity’s financial performance. 
 
The above paragraphs leave room for the disclosure of other accounts, whether in the 
balance sheet or in the income statement, provided that their disclosure is relevant to 
understanding the entity’s performance. 
 
How do we know whether the disclosure of these performance measures is relevant? In 
the article by Marques (2017), a survey of research on performance measures is 
presented, which can shed light on this use. The article: ‘…shows how non-GAAP 
earnings have been found to be more informative than GAAP earnings in several 
scenarios (countries where non-GAAP disclosures are compulsory, countries where 
these disclosures are voluntary but regulated and countries where they are not 
regulated). However, in certain circumstances, these disclosures may also mislead 
investors. Corporate governance mechanisms can curb managers’ opportunistic use of 
these measures’. 
 
 
Also, Barker et al. (2013) highlight that, without strong enforcement, principles-based 
accounting can lead to weak accounting: ‘On the other hand, in high-incentive 
situations, principles-based standards tend to perform poorly, especially in the absence 
of strong enforcement’. 
 
In addition, we know that GAAP implementation is influenced by legal and institutional 
aspects (Burgstahler, Hail & Leuz, 2006; Holthausen, 2009; Soderstrom & Sun, 2007; 
Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer & Riedl, 2010; Walker, 2010; Christensen, Hail & Leuz, 
2013). These studies reveal that the informational function of accounting can be 
questioned in environments with low legal protection for investors, a weakly developed 
capital market, a weak institutional environment, and corporate governance practices 
that do not guarantee equal rights for the shareholders. 
 
Another point of concern is found in the works of Watts & Zimmerman, who link the 
accounting practices to Jensen & Meckling’s (1976) agency theory. The manager can 
use her/his discretionary power in view of the accounting alternatives, aiming to 
maximize her/his utility function to attend to her/his preferences (Jensen & Meckling, 
1998). Considering the company as a network of contracts, Watts & Zimmerman (1986) 
developed hypotheses to explain variations in accounting, which rested on distinct 
incentives among the parties. 
 
In this context, we believe that the risk of discretion to achieve self-interest can be 
represented by the letter f) of item 5.11 in the DP: ‘some performance measures are 
misleading because they do not present a neutral picture of the entity.’ Therefore, the 
document recognises the possibility of that the performance measure does not represent 
a neutral picture of the entity, which is contrary to accounting objectives. For this 
reason, letter d) of item 5.34 is intended to block the disclosure of misleading 
information: ‘neutral, free from error and clearly labelled so it is not misleading’. 
 
In view of all aspects raised, we agree with the view of the board to disclose 
performance measures in accordance with DP 5.34. Our opinion was mainly based on 
the empirical evidence in favour of the disclosure of these performance measures, or 
non-IFRS earnings. Nevertheless, an alert is due because of the possibility of 
misleading disclosure in some circumstances (Marques, 2017). 
 
One way to mitigate this problem would be to change letter g) of item 34 to: ‘presented 
in a way that makes it clear whether the performance measure forms part of the financial 
statements and submit it to a compulsory audit’. By extending the performance 
measures to the set of financial statements, we do not agree that the manager is free to 
choose not to audit. 
 
In addition, by agreeing with this change, we should take care not to increase the length 
of the notes to the financial statements. In the paper by Barker et al. (2013), the need 
for improvements in the notes to the financial statements is acknowledged: ‘…strong 
consensus in the financial community that disclosure in the notes to the financial 
statements have become unwieldy’ and ‘…far too complex to be easily understood’. 
 
 
6. Disclosure of Accounting Policies  
 
 
Section 6 of the DP deals with accounting policies and the fact that users of financial 
statements often express concerns about how accounting policies are disclosed in the 
financial statements. In this regard, the first question posed in the DP is related to the 
Board’s preliminary view stating that a general disclosure standard should include 
requirements on determining which accounting policies to disclose. And we agree with 
the Board’s preliminary view. Only with a clear definition of the requirements on 
determining which accounting policies to disclose can the effectiveness of disclosures 
for the users of financial statements be improved. 
The disclosure of accounting policies is essential for the interpretation of financial 
statements by users because they can then assess methods and principles upon which 
firms have prepared their information on financial position and financial performance 
and to forecast future earnings. Lawrence (2013) shows that clear and concise 
accounting policy disclosures result in higher-quality financial information that is more 
understandable for investors. Hope (2003) finds that accounting policy disclosures are 
incrementally useful to analysts over and above all other annual report disclosures and 
reduce uncertainty about forecasted earnings. In a similar vein, Chang & Most (1985) 
find that analysts rate accounting policies disclosures higher than other disclosures.  
The current standard (IAS 1) already requires entities to disclose ‘significant accounting 
policies’ which should allow the ‘understanding of how transactions, other events and 
conditions are reflected in financial statements’. However, the requirement that 
significant accounting policies must be disclosed seems, in itself, not sufficient to 
ensure the usefulness of the financial information provided. In fact, the literature shows 
that firms tend to adopt checklists, tend to use boilerplate terminology, disclose 
irrelevant information and omit relevant disclosures.  
The use of checklists may have negative effects in terms of reinforcing biases and 
decreasing auditors’ professional scepticism (Asare & Wright, 2004; Pincus, 1989); 
having effects on judgements in areas other than the one the checklist pertains to 
(Rinsum, Maas & Stolker, 2018); and bears the risk of a ‘tick box’ mentality, where 
firms merely increase boilerplate disclosure (Daske, Hail, Leuz & Verdi, 2013; 
Christensen et al., 2013).  
In fact, the use of boilerplate disclosure is a primary concern (FASB, 2012; 
Hoogervorst, 2013) since it may provide opportunities to hide information or to only 
reduce legal or reputational exposure rather than to improve informativeness. Previous 
studies show the use of boilerplate language in different areas such as financial 
instruments (Stadler & Nobes, 2014), impairment of assets (Amiraslani, Iatridis & 
Pope, 2013) and derivatives (Bean & Irvine, 2015). Stadler & Nobes (2014) describe 
how many firms had merely printed standard paragraphs about policies on financial 
instruments. Firms identified and described all the categories of financial instruments 
defined in IAS 39 even when they did not have instruments in all those categories. 
Amiraslani et al. (2013) find that compliance with impairment disclosures requiring a 
higher effort is lower than compliance with low-effort disclosure requirements, 
revealing a tendency to use boilerplate language. They concluded that the use of 
boilerplate language may be a mean to quickly comply with reporting requirements.  
The use of boilerplate language is also related to disclosure of non-relevant information. 
To comply with reporting requirements, firms disclose information that is not relevant 
 
to stakeholders. The disclosure of irrelevant information can lead to obscuring, 
intentionally or not, useful information, adding to the time needed to process the 
information (Jackson & Farzaneh, 2012) and complicating the work of preparers and 
auditors (Hoitash & Hoitash, 2018). In fact, the disclosure of information raises a 
competition issue, i.e. disclosures compete for users’ attention (Ben-Shahar & 
Schneider, 2014). Additionally, it is often easier for management to include immaterial 
information in the financial statements rather than monitoring on an ongoing basis 
whether that information is material and/or justify the removal of disclosures towards 
auditors or regulators. 
The requirement that accounting policies shall be entity-specific, significant and related 
to material items and the identification of categories of accounting policies by the IASB 
(DP 6.12) seem to be an important step to solve the problems described above. More 
importantly, accounting policies should be given greater prominence in financial 
reports. The inclusion of the summary of significant accounting policies should be 
sufficiently tailored or contextualised with regard to the enterprise. We consider that 
only the first two categories of accounting policies should be defined: category 1 
(accounting policies that are always necessary for understanding financial statements 
and relate to material items) and category 2 (other accounting policies that relate to 
material items).  
Guidance on what information is not required by accounting standards and pertaining 
to immaterial items (Category 3) should not be provided, because it is not necessary for 
an understanding and interpretation of the financial statements. In addition, the standard 
should clearly state that immaterial disclosures should be omitted. This statement is 
important in order to prevent supervisors and enforcement entities from acting against 
firms that omit immaterial disclosures. In addition, it is important to create a 
disincentive for auditors to encourage immaterial disclosures and the use of disclosure 
checklists. 
As for the location of accounting policy disclosures, we consider that guidance should 
be included in a general disclosure standard and not as part of non-mandatory guidance. 
It can be argued that mandatory disclosure may be superfluous and wasteful for two 
reasons. First, because firms have incentives to provide voluntary disclosures in an 
efficient way (e.g., to lower the cost of capital) (Ross, 1979) and accounting standards 
per se play a limited role in firms’ decisions about accounting practices (Ball, Robin & 
Wu, 2003; Daske et al., 2013). However, mandatory disclosure is the best tool to solve 
contracting and coordination issues and to avoid the under-production of information. 
As the issue is largely behavioural, the inclusion of the guidance in a general disclosure 
standard may reduce costs of processing by standardising information; make it easier 
for users to process it (Mahoney, 1995; Zingales, 2009); and increase comparability 
(Lang & Stice-Lawrence, 2015).  
The Board should develop guidance on the location of accounting policy disclosures 
and we agree that significant judgements and assumptions should be described in the 
same note as the accounting policy is disclosed.  
The inclusion of accounting policies in one note has several advantages: Some 
accounting policies are related to each other and benefit from being placed 
together; some policies are not directly related to a single note; and users are used to 
 
this form of presentation since it has been the norm for many years and they are then 
able to locate them quickly and easily. It is probably more time consuming to locate 
each policy if they are spread out across the notes and it reduces standardisation across 
companies. But, integrating accounting policies into each note or section also have 
some advantages: The description of the accounting policy provides necessary context 
to the numbers, and this is most effective if presented together; and it may reduce 
duplication within the notes. The location of accounting policy disclosures in the same 
note as the information to which it relates will reduce the length of the note Summary 
of significant accounting policies. This note is one of those that has longer disclosures 
(Cheung & Lau, 2016) and reducing its length may increase the readability of the notes.  
However, the guidance should not be overly prescriptive with regard to location and 
entities should have some flexibility to determine the form of disclosure that best meets 
the needs of the users of financial information. So, it is important to allow entities to 
use another location, if that location increases the understandability of the notes and 
other financial statements. 
 
7. Centralised Disclosure Objectives 
 
Section 7 of the DP discusses whether the Board should develop centralised disclosure 
objectives and if they should be included in a single standard or a set of standards that 
cover all disclosures in the financial statements. Centralised disclosure objectives are 
high-level objectives, which could form a framework to guide the IASB in setting 
disclosure objectives in specific standards. Currently, some standards have item-
specific disclosure objectives but they are largely developed in isolation from objectives 
in other standards. Centralised disclosure objectives could increase coherence of 
objectives in individual standards. Centralised objectives would also help preparers 
understand how to apply disclosure requirements in individual standards. 
 
In our opinion, the Board should develop centralised disclosure objectives. If future 
disclosure standards are more principles-based than today, it is essential to base them 
on high-level objectives in order to make the standards interpretable by preparers. In 
addition, even if future disclosure standards are rules-based we see it as important to 
have disclosures objectives. This will help the Board in the development of new 
standards, as well as guide preparers, auditors, users and others in the interpretation of 
standards. 
 
Having concluded that centralised disclosure objectives are desirable, we continue with 
the difficult question of how such objectives could be developed. A basic question is if 
there are high-level objectives from which disclosure objectives can be deduced. The 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting states that the objective of financial 
reporting is to provide information that is useful for investors and creditors in making 
investment and lending decisions, in forming expectations about future cash flows.7 
More specifically, investors and creditors need information about the reporting entity’s 
resources and claims on those resources, changes in resources and claims, and the 
efficiency and effectiveness of management (chapter 1). This suggests both a valuation 
and a stewardship perspective. 
 
 
The Conceptual Framework further defines ‘useful’ as information that is relevant and 
faithfully represented. Relevance is supported by a focus on materiality and even 
information with high measurement uncertainty could be relevant (chapter 2). The 
objective of financial statements is more specific and is defined as ‘to provide 
information about an entity’s assets, liabilities, equity, income and expenses that is 
useful to users of financial statements in assessing the prospects for future net cash 
inflows to the entity and in assessing management’s stewardship of the entity’s 
resources’ (paragraph 3.4). There is an emphasis on financial statement items, and on 
both valuation and stewardship perspectives. 
 
The references to the Conceptual Framework presented do not give much concrete 
guidance on what the appropriate disclosure objectives are or how they may be 
developed. The DP is more concrete, specifically the ‘principles of effective 
communication’ listed in paragraph 2.6 (see Section 3). 
 
The objectives of disclosures will depend on financial statement users and how they 
use financial statements (Barker et al., 2013). Therefore, it is not clear that it is possible 
to develop one set of disclosure objectives that would result in relevant disclosures for 
most users in most situations. The Board limits intended users to investors and creditors 
that do not have access to direct information from management and limits their use of 
financial statements to prediction of future cash flows. Still, variation in user needs is 
likely to remain problematic for at least three reasons. First, in practice there are other 
users that rely on financial statements. Even if it is not the purpose of IFRS to provide 
information to such users, there could be unintended and costly consequences (cf. 
Brüggemann et al., 2013). Second, even the users in focus by the Board will take both 
a valuation and a stewardship perspective into account in their use of financial 
statements and the objectives of disclosures are likely to differ between the two usages. 
Third, equity investors and creditors have different economic exposures in their relation 
to firms, which results in different information needs. Still, the trade-offs referred to 
above are not new to standard setters as they have previously been addressed when 
developing objectives for recognition and measurement. 
 
According to Beyer, Cohen, Lys & Walther (2010), any financial statement disclosure 
that provides information about the value of a firm is relevant in the valuation 
perspective. In the stewardship perspective, disclosures that provide information on 
management effort are relevant. Accordingly, the stewardship perspective implies a 
need for disclosures that distinguish between firm performance that results from 
management effort and results that are due to other factors. Even for the users in focus 
by the Board (investors and creditors that do not receive information directly from 
management) both the valuation and the stewardship perspectives can be important, as 
suggested in the Conceptual Framework. In addition, there are other users, such as large 
owners and independent board members that have a stewardship perspective. While 
Core, Hail & Verdi (2015) show that large ownership functions as a substitute for 
disclosure, Ozkan, Singer & You (2012) suggest that financial statements matter to 
independent board members. The difference between the valuation and stewardship 
perspectives is likely to have an effect on any centralised disclosure objectives that are 
developed. Watts (2003a, 2003b) claim that there is greater need for verifiability in 
financial statements for creditors than for equity investors. Watts refers to 
measurement, not disclosures. However, to the extent that the reasoning is transferable 
to the area of disclosures, it is likely to have a large impact on the way disclosures – 
 
and disclosure objectives – should be formulated (see also discussion on enforceability 
below). 
 
In addition to a variety of user needs, centralised disclosure objectives must consider 
differences in relevant disclosures in different situations. There are indications in the 
literature that simplified and comparable financial information is especially important 
for firms with high complexity in operations. André, Filip & Moldovan (2016) suggest 
that even sophisticated users may have difficulties in understanding complex 
operations. Beccalli, Miller & O’Leary (2015) show the need for financial disclosures 
in an industry characterised by high technical complexity. 
 
While it would be impractical for the Board to develop multiple sets of disclosure 
objectives for different users and usages, a trade-off between different objectives is 
necessary. It is unlikely that any one set of centralised disclosure objectives will lead to 
optimal disclosure standards for all situations. 
 
In the development of disclosure objectives, and the standards that ensue, it is also 
necessary to consider the likely outcome of standards in practice. The outcome will be 
affected by national context, managerial incentives and enforcement. An important 
dimension for how to think about such effects is the extent to which disclosure 
standards are principles-based or rules-based. Principles-based standards allow 
management to exercise judgement in the preparation of disclosures. This would seem 
a necessary condition for the provision of entity-specific information. There is, 
however, a potential problem that principles-based standards also give room for 
management to act on their incentives, to the detriment of users. This problem can be 
mitigated through enforcement. 
 
There are many different incentives that could affect management in its disclosure 
choices. Agency costs arise when disclosures affect the relationship between 
management, owners and creditors (Beyer et al., 2010). André et al. (2016) and Mazzi, 
André, Dionysiou & Tsalavoutas (2017) show that incentives to not disclose proprietary 
information affect mandatory disclosure choices. These are just examples. There are 
many types of possible incentives that could affect management. Strong enforcement 
could be one way to make principles-based standards have the intended outcomes 
(Brown, 2011). While there is not much direct evidence on the effect of enforcement 
on disclosures, the literature generally reports positive effects of enforcement on 
recognition and measurement (e.g. Brown, Preiato & Tarca, 2014). For enforcement to 
work, it is necessary that standards are enforceable (and auditable). Barker et al. (2013) 
express serious concerns about the enforceability of principles-based disclosure 
standards. One way to approach the issue of enforceability may be to focus on 
materiality. In order for firms to disclose relevant entity-specific information it is 
necessary to apply materiality (e.g. Doupnik & Seese, 2001; Gleason & Mills, 2002; 
Liu & Mittelstaedt, 2002). We see it as positive that the Board has recently improved 
the materiality guidance for preparers. However, as materiality is inherently entity-
specific, it will still be a challenge to make standards fully enforceable with regard to 
materiality. 
 
One objective of IFRS is to achieve international harmonisation. Still, the literature has 
noted continuing differences in how IFRS is implemented, both for measurement 
(Nobes, 2013) and disclosures (Glaum, Schmidt, Street & Vogel, 2013). It is unclear to 
 
what extent principles-based disclosure standards can contribute to increasing 
harmonisation. 
 
To the extent that international differences in the implementation of IFRS reflect 
economic, legal and political differences, such differences contribute to more relevant 
financial reporting (Ball, 2016; Watts, 2006). If so, the difficulty in formulating 
centralised disclosure objectives is to ascertain their applicability in different national 
contexts. 
 
The DP proposes two different methods of developing centralised disclosure objectives, 
referred to as Method A and Method B. Under Method A, disclosure objectives are 
organised by type of information. Examples of different types of information include 
accounting policy information, information related to disaggregation of items in 
primary financial statements, information about unrecognised items, and information 
related to risks and uncertainties. Method A is largely consistent with the way 
disclosure requirements are currently expressed in standards. Consequently, preparers 
would be familiar with this approach, but it may not lead to a fundamental change in 
disclosure requirements. Under Method B, disclosure objectives are organised by 
activities of reporting entities. Examples include information about operating activities, 
investing activities, financing activities and taxation. Method B would involve a 
fundamental change in how the IASB develops disclosure requirements, which – if 
implemented – could result in the need for substantial educational resources. 
The IASB asks for opinions about each of the two methods. Before giving such 
opinions, we discuss the content and role of notes. The Conceptual Framework, 
paragraph 7.3, states that the notes contain information about both recognised and 
unrecognised items, including risks, and methods used and judgements made in 
estimating amounts. The DP (paragraph 7.17) adds that notes contain information about 
the reporting entity, the stewardship of management, and events after the reporting 
period. 
 
It is clear that the notes are closely linked with the four primary financial statements, 
especially the statement of profit or loss and the statement of financial position. 
Centralised disclosure objectives will not be independent of the primary financial 
statements. For example, as disclosures about recognised items differ from disclosures 
about unrecognised items, the notes reflect the application of recognition criteria. 
Further, if more uncertainty is allowed in recognition and measurement, disclosures 
about this uncertainty will become more important (e.g. Blacconiere, Frederickson, 
Johnson & Lewis, 2011). Given the Board’s intention to continue allowing a high level 
of judgement in the preparation of financial statements, disclosures about measurement 
uncertainty is expected to remain important. In addition, disclosures should be more 
important if earnings quality is lower (Verrecchia, 1983). Empirically, however, 
Francis et al. (2008) find the opposite. A different type of link is that disclosures in the 
notes could function as a deterrent against recognition and measurement manipulation 
(cf. Hope & Thomas, 2008). In summary, disclosure objectives cannot be developed in 
isolation from recognition and measurement objectives. 
 
The Conceptual Framework suggests that disclosures about risk are important, even if 
risk is not defined (paragraphs BC7.11 and BC7.12). The literature supports this view, 
e.g. Yang, Yu, Liu & Wu (2018). Although research does not give a clear answer 
 
whether Method A or B – or any other method – should be preferred, we summarise 
the arguments here. 
 
First, we relate to the distinction between principles-based and rules-based standards. 
It appears to us that Method B would be more aligned with a principles-based approach. 
Therefore, to the extent that principles-based standards are preferable, Method B could 
have advantages. We also recognise, however, that Method A could be used to develop 
principles-based standards. 
 
Second, we relate to the purpose of the notes. As discussed above, the Conceptual 
Framework defines the purpose of the notes in relation to financial statement elements 
and there are strong links between them. The more holistic approach in Method B (DP 
7.26) agrees with how an analysis of a firm is conducted, i.e. analysing business 
operations and financing aspects separately. However, even if Method B mirrors users’ 
actions, it may still be more useful to the user to receive information in accordance with 
Method A, where users may be allowed to make more independent classifications of 
the information.  
 
Third, we discuss the expected goal fulfilment of Methods A and B. The three 
disclosure problems listed in the DP, paragraph 1.5 are: (1) not enough relevant 
information, (2) irrelevant information, and (3) ineffective communication. Although it 
is far from clear that there would be any difference in the relative success of the two 
methods, it is possible that the more holistic approach of Method B would have 
advantages in making the communication more effective. More importantly, as the 
Board itself points out, the key to improving disclosures is to have a change in 
behaviour. We do not agree with the Board’s view that Method B is more likely to lead 
to a change in behaviour simply because it is a new approach. Novelty could easily be 
introduced in Method A, but we do not believe novelty per se will change behaviour.  
 
Although both Method A and Method B have advantages and disadvantages, in 
summary we believe Method A would be more useful. This method is also possible to 
combine with an approach that focuses on the content of disclosures. 
 
Finally, the DP asks if disclosure objectives and requirements should be located in a 
single standard or included in different IFRS Standards. In this respect, the literature 
does not give guidance on the structure of accounting standards, as it is focused instead 
on the content of standards. The answer to this question largely depends on whether 
Method A or Method B is chosen. Locating all disclosure requirements in one single 
standard would be more in agreement with Method B than with Method A. If the focus 
is on the link between individual financial statement items and disclosures (Method A) 
it would seem more relevant to include disclosure objectives in different IFRS 
Standards. 
 
 
8. New Zealand Accounting Standards Board Staff’s Approach to Disclosure 
 
In Section 8, the DP describes an approach for how to draft disclosure requirements, 
developed by the staff of the New Zealand Accounting Standards Board (NZASB). 
Their approach addresses concerns that the drafting of IFRS Standards may contribute 
to the disclosure problem and illustrates how the disclosure objectives and requirements 
 
might be drafted in a way that supports more effective disclosures in financial 
statements.  
 
The main features of the NZASB approach are: (a) the inclusion of disclosure 
objectives, comprising an overall disclosure objective for each IFRS Standard and more 
specific disclosure subobjectives for each type of information required to meet that 
overall disclosure objective; (b) the division of disclosure requirements into two tiers, 
where the amount of information to be disclosed relies on the relative importance of an 
item or transaction and the extent of judgement required. The two tiers would be (1) 
summary information intended to provide users with an overall picture of the effect of 
the item or transaction and (2) additional information that an entity would consider in 
order to meet the disclosure objective, (c) greater emphasis on the need to exercise 
judgement when deciding how and what to disclose to meet the disclosure objectives 
and (d) less prescriptive wording in disclosure requirements.  
 
In our opinion, the NZASB approach provides a good and pragmatic example of how 
to draft disclosure requirements. In substance, the NZASB proposes to introduce 
specific disclosure objectives for each standard, allowing the preparer two different 
levels (tier 1 and tier 2) of disclosure: tier 1, intended to provide a summary disclosure 
as a basic level for all the users, and tier 2 for additional information if the company 
perceives a need to give more detailed information in order to meet the disclosure 
objectives. The idea of identifying a minimum basic level, defined from a user 
perspective, is well in line with our discussion in Section 1 on firms that provide poor 
disclosures and how to ensure a minimum level of disclosures for these entities in order 
to protect investors. 
 
We agree with the proposed distinction between basic disclosures and additional 
information. The creation of different levels of disclosure, and their separate graphical 
evidence, could be useful for users with different information needs, as empirical 
research has demonstrated (Riise Johansen & Plenborg, 2013). The hierarchy suggests 
that the distinction is pragmatic (Bloomfield, 2012) between ‘elevated’ disclosure, 
obtained with some graphical expedient, and general disclosure.  
 
With regard to tier 2, we think it would be useful to have some guidance showing how 
to enrich and/or detail tier 1 information. Some useful references are the various 
dimensions of disclosure proposed by Beattie, McInnes & Fearnley (2004). Their 
different dimensions concern time (past/present/future), and the nature of information 
(qualitative/quantitative, financial/non-financial). To this classification, it could be 
useful to add the other dimension of space (segment/entity/group). In other words, tier 
2 could be used to add the above dimensions to the information given at tier 1. 
 
We have some concerns about the disclosure objectives for each standard in the NZASB 
proposal. The general objectives of financial disclosure are posed in the Framework 
and IAS 1 and we do not see the need of more specific objectives for each group of 
elements ruled by each standard. Instead of specific objectives, we think it may be more 
useful that each standard identifies the specific topics of disclosure. Topics necessary 
to disclose could then be separated from possible firm-specific topics.  
 
In summary we think the NZASB approach may provide the right balance between 
flexibility for companies and the availability of a minimum, mandatory level of 
 
disclosure. For this reason, we think the Board should adopt the NZASB staff’s 
approach in its Standards-level Review of Disclosures project, while considering 
clarification guidance regarding the way to enrich information at tier 2, and the 
proposition of having a list of topics instead of a list of objectives as proposed by 
NZASB, as possible improvements. 
 
The DP also asks about the debate of stakeholders regarding the way IFRS Standards 
are currently drafted. Some of them say that it contributes to the ‘disclosure problem’ 
due to the absence of clear disclosure objectives and the presence of long lists of 
prescriptively written disclosure requirements in the IFRS Standards. However, some 
other stakeholders observe that specific disclosure requirements might be simpler to 
use than applying judgements when determining how to meet disclosure objectives.  
 
We suggest two possible improvements for this issue, in terms of format. First, we 
perceive the necessity of a clearer separation of mandatory disclosure that companies 
have to provide in any case from disclosures dependent on the recurrence of some 
specific events/circumstances (e.g., under IAS 36, information about the CGU is 
requested only in the case of impairment/reversal of impairment recognition, para. 
130d).  Second, it could be useful to make cross-references in the body of each standard 
to the specific points of the same standard where disclosures are required. In this way, 
the typical ‘list’ at the end of the standard may be better understood.  
 
We believe a comprehensive list of the prevailing disclosure requirements of all IFRS 
Standards would be useful to entities (and also to researchers).   
 
A final suggestion concerns the relationship between notes and the ‘Management 
Discussion and Analysis’ (MD&A). Many companies, depending on jurisdiction, 
repeat the same information in the notes and in the MD&A (the segment information 
based on IFRS 8 is a classic example), or, in worst case, they do not consider the notes 
as the right place to include it, preferring the MD&A. We think this question should be 
specifically addressed by the IASB. 
 
 
Conclusions 
In the DP the IASB discusses several issues, identified for example through the Board’s 
Agenda Consultations. There are perceived quality problems with disclosures, 
specifically that there is not enough relevant information, too much irrelevant 
information and that existing information is not effectively communicated. We agree 
that disclosures should be relevant to users. However, what constitutes relevant 
information is entity-specific and disclosure of such information therefore requires 
preparer judgement and may be difficult to enforce. 
The DP suggests several ways to provide guidance both to preparers of financial 
statements and to the Board in developing disclosure standards. We are generally 
supportive of the proposed principles of effective communication (see Appendix 1), but 
the purpose of disclosures could be better specified. We also support the development 
of clearer guidance to what should be included in primary financial statements and what 
should be in the notes. This is of particular importance as research shows that users 
treat recognised and disclosed items differently. One of the principles of effective 
 
communication is clearer links between different information in the financial 
statements. Consistent with this principle, it is positive that the IASB proposes to 
develop guidance for how performance measures such as EBITDA and EBIT are linked 
to IFRS. Disclosure of accounting policies is identified as particularly problematic in 
current practice, often containing large amounts of irrelevant information. We, 
therefore, agree that the Board should develop disclosure standards that help preparers 
discern significant accounting policies. The development of centralised disclosure 
objectives could be a way to make overall disclosures more entity-specific, and also to 
increase consistency across different disclosure standards. 
Overall, we are generally positive towards the proposals put forward by the IASB in 
the DP. It is our opinion that many of the proposals in the DP would be helpful to 
preparers in achieving higher quality disclosures, especially for preparers who attempt 
to provide entity-specific information. However, the challenge remains to develop 
disclosure standards for situations where preparers have incentives not to provide 
relevant information. While the DP in its current stage identifies which steps the IASB 
should take to increase disclosure quality, it says little about how the Board could act 
in taking the proposed steps. We support the IASB in its effort to improve the quality 
of disclosures, but also note that the most difficult work remains to be done. 
 
Notes 
 
1 One set of IASB actions dealing directly with the disclosure problem targets the application of the 
materiality concept. This is further described in Section 1, but it may be noted already here that these 
actions have continued since the DP (IASB, 2017), for example, in an agenda paper from October 2018, 
concerning disclosures of accounting policies (IASB, 2018), IASB staff recommend the Board to 
‘…clarify that not all accounting policies relating to material transactions, other events or conditions are 
themselves material’ (p. 2). The paper explicitly refers to a user describing accounting policy disclosures 
as ‘probably the most visible reason why this project started in the first place. [Accounting policy 
disclosures] are so meaningless and eat up so much space [in the financial statements]’ (pp. 3-4). This 
user comment on the disclosures can be made because the disclosures are there – the opposite comment 
will be more difficult to make, i.e. what information will be missing in a decision context where the 
disclosed accounting policy matters and where the entity has incentives to disclose as little as possible? 
 
2 ‘Duplication of information’ refers to the practice of repeating information in a financial report without 
adding further information. As an example, the DP (IASB, 2017, p. 20) refers to when the note disclosure 
for inventories repeats the information in the statement of financial position without adding further 
information.  
 
3 Principle 12 in the EFRAG/FRC/ANC Discussion Paper: Care should be taken in applying the 
materiality principle in practice, bearing in mind that disclosing immaterial information (and information 
on situations that do not apply in practice to the reporting entity) reduces the relevance and the 
understandability of disclosures. 
 
4 ISA 720, ‘The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information’, does include a definition of 
‘annual report’. 
 
5 Source: https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/nongaapinterp.htm 
 
6 Kolev et al. (2008) define ‘high quality’ adjustments as those that are more transitory, i.e. the 
‘appropriate’ items are excluded from GAAP earnings. They split total adjustments into ‘special items’ 
(i.e. those that are typically viewed as nonrecurring by financial statement users) and ‘other’ adjustments. 
 
7 Following the Board’s approach in the Discussion Paper, we refer to the 2015 Exposure Draft 
(ED/2015/3) and not the Conceptual Framework adopted in 2010. 
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Appendix 1. The DP List of the Principles of Effective Communication 
 
(a)  entity-specific, since information tailored to an entity’s own circumstances is more 
useful than generic, ‘boilerplate’ language or information that is readily available 
outside the financial statements;   
 
(b)  described as simply and directly as possible without a loss of material information 
and without unnecessarily increasing the length of the financial statements;   
 
(c)  organised in a way that highlights important matters—this includes providing 
disclosures in an appropriate order and emphasizing the important matters within them;   
 
(d)  linked when relevant to other information in the financial statements or to other 
parts of the annual report (see Section 4 Location of information) to highlight 
relationships between pieces of information and improve navigation through the 
financial statements;   
 
(e)  not duplicated unnecessarily in different parts of the financial statements or the 
annual report;   
 
(f)  provided in a way that optimises comparability among entities and across reporting 
periods without compromising the usefulness of the information; and   
 
(g)  provided in a format that is appropriate for that type of information—for example, 
lists can be used to break up long narrative text, and tables may be preferable for data-
intensive information, such as reconciliations, maturity analysis etc.   
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Example of a Strategy for Increasing the Effectiveness of 
Communication 
 
Iteration 1: to explain aims and objectives of the disclosures and their connections with 
the objectives of the organisation 
 
Iteration 2: to create a profile of the intended users (using stakeholder mapping to create 
this profile) 
 
Iteration 3: to provide a clear description of the notes required to be delivered to the 
users 
 
Iteration 4: to identify the channels and formats that will be used to communicate the 
information 
 
